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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ROY DRAKE IRVIN,

Case No. 2006063 8-CA

Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from two convictions for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and one conviction for failure to
respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41 -6a-210 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Was defendant entitled to have his jury convictions for aggravated robbery
merged for punishment purposes where they were based on different acts and elements,
and also involved different victims?
Standard of review. Merger is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v.
Smith, 2003 UT App 179, f 7, 72 P.3d 692.

2. Has defendant shown that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not
objecting to dangerous weapon enhancements and anecdotal statistical evidence?
Standard of review. Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised for the
first time on appeal present questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. State v.
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ^[ 11, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 45; State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, \
6, 122P.3d615.
3. Are defendant's two enhanced first degree felony sentences of six-years-to-life
illegal under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?
Standard of review. Whether an appellate court may review the legality of a sentence
under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, involves the interpretation of a rule, a
legal determination. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Copies of the following pertinent statutes are attached in addendum E.
§ 76-1-401 (West 2004);
§ 76-1-402 (West 2004);
§ 76-1-601 (West 2004);
§ 76-3-203.8 (West 2004);
§ 76-6-302 (West 2004);
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
Utah R.Evid. 403.

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, both first
degree felony offenses, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). In the
alternative to the second count of aggravated robbery, defendant was charged with theft, a
second degree felony offense, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). He
was also charged with failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony
offense, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210 (West 2004). R29A-29C.
Conviction. Following a two-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts
of aggravated robbery, and failure to stop. R283-85; R367:54-55.
Motion to vacate one of two convictions for aggravated robbery denied. Before
sentencing, defendant moved to vacate one of his two convictions for aggravated robbery.
R292-302 (a copy of the motion is attached in addendum A). Defendant asserted that his
convictions for aggravated robbery should be merged because they were part of a single
criminal episode with a single objective and thus constituted the "same act" for punishment
purposes under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(1) (West 2004).1 R296-98. Defendant

Section 76-1-402(1) provides:
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution
under any other such provision.
3

maintained this was true, even though the State pled "different 'theories' for different
charges." R298. According to defendant, the State alleged that he "committed aggravated
robbery by committing robbery[,] and in the course of the robbery, 1) using a dangerous
weapon, and 2) taking an operable motor vehicle," but defendant maintained his "convictions
should merge because there was a single crime capable of proof under multiple theories."
R298, 300.
The State responded that defendant misread section 76-1 -402( 1), that two separate and
distinct aggravated robberies occurred here, and that the second aggravated robbery—the
taking of the convenience store clerk's personal vehicle—was not merely incidental too, or
part of the first aggravated robbery—taking cash from the convenience store register. See
R305-12.
The trial court heard the parties' oral argument on 11 May 2006 and denied
defendant's motion:
. . . I don't think the decision has to turn on whether you have one or
two victims, or whether you have a victim who owns the money but wasn't
there, or the property was taken from the person who had the responsibility of
the money, an employee like in this case. I don't think the decision should turn
on that.
Whether there were two separate crimes that are charged separately
even though they may be in a single criminal episode—and I look at a single
criminal episode as just a procedural matter. Single criminal episode you try
them all at once, if you can't you try them separately. But it seems to me the

The complete text of section 76-1-402 is set out in addendum E.
4

better rationale has to be here that certainly a robbery has to occur, and it can
only occur when the property is taken from a person.
In this case we have a—we have a robbery, and [defendant] came into
the store and he took the property that was owned by the store owner—who
wasn't there, but under the care, custody or control of his employee who was
there—by force or fear. I agree with the State[,] at that point in time, that
crime ends as far as the robbery is concerned. If something had have happened
in the back room besides just taking [the store clerk's] keys, then everybody
agrees it would be another crime. But at that point in time, after the force and
fear are necessary to get the cash out of the cash register is concluded,
[defendant] takes [the store clerk] in the back room, the force and fear
continues and she gives up the keys to her car.
Now, granted it's the same person from whom the property was taken.
If it wasn't, the second charge wouldn't be a robbery it would be something
else. But her property was taken from her against her will by force or fear and
that is her automobile. And I think that constitutes a separate crime.
And the reason I do say that is in the circumstances of this case, and
each case turns on its own, factually anyway, but it just seems to me once the
initial crime is completed, the robbery—taking the money by force and
fear—is completed and then there's a second type of property taken from—in
this case, this is her personal property, this isn't her property that's being taken
that she has charge of as an employee—and through force and fear, you've got
a second crime.
So, accordingly, I deny the defense motion.
R368:24-26 (a complete copy of the oral argument and ruling transcript is attached as
addendum B). The trial court's oral ruling was reduced to written findings:
1.

The defendant entered the Fastback [sic] Convenience Store in Salt Lake
County ("the store") and held a knife against the store clerk,... ("the victim")
to induce her to open the store cash register. The defendant then took money
from the register that was under the victim's care and control, but which
belonged to the store owner.

5

2.

Still in possession of the knife, the defendant then told the victim to give him
her car keys. He then took her to the back of the store, talked about tying her
up, and told her to stay in the back of the store when he left. These
actions—taking the victim's car keys, removing her to the back of the store,
talking about tying her up, and telling her to stay put—were committed to
facilitate taking the victim's personal vehicle. The defendant left the building
and drove away in the victim's personal vehicle.

R319 (a copy of the written ruling is attached in addendum C). Based on these findings, the
trial court concluded that:
1.

Taking the money from the store cash register completed the first,
separate offense of [aggravated [rjobbery.

2,

The defendant began a second, separate offense of [aggravated [rjobbery
when he took the victim's personal car keys, removed her to the back of the
store, talked about tying her up, and told her to stay there. When he took the
victim's motor vehicle, the defendant completed the second, separate offense
of [aggravated [rjobbery.

Id.
Sentence. On 9 June 2006, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of six years
to life for the aggravated robbery convictions, and a consecutive sentence of zero to five
years for the failure to stop conviction. R315-17; R369:12-13.
Timely notice of appeal and transfer order. Defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal on 3 July 2006. R324. The Utah Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction of the appeal
to this Court on 25 August 2006. R358.

6

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
Defendant held a knife to a convenience store clerk's neck and forced her to hand over
(1) approximately $15000 in small bills from the store cash register, and (2) the keys to her
personal vehicle, which he used to flee the scene.
*

*

*

On 3 July 2005, Teresa Celis worked the evening shift at the Fast Track convenience
store in Salt Lake City, Utah. R366:94-95. Defendant entered the store three different times
during her shift. R3 66:94-96. The first two times, defendant attempted to get cash from an
ATM inside the store. R366:102-04. After defendant's second attempt, Teresa caught a
glimpse of defendant's ATM card and saw that it was a Comdata card, a type used by
professional truck drivers to buy fuel and get cash advances. R366:103-04. Defendant
turned to Teresa and said, "My money still isn't there," and "I'll be back and give it more
time." R366:104.
First aggravated robbery. About twenty minutes later, defendant entered the store
a third time, stopped at the ATM, and re-inserted his card. R366:105. Teresa went behind
the counter while defendant was at the ATM. Id. Defendant left the ATM and approached
the counter, asking Teresa for a pack of COOL super-long cigarettes, or COOL 100's.
R366:105-06. When Teresa bent down to reach the cigarettes, defendant stepped to her left,

2

The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State
v. Tiliaia, 2006 UT App 474, ^ 2 n.l, 566 Utah Adv. Rep. 32.
7

toward the gap giving access to the area behind the counter. R366:106-07; see also State's
Exh. # 2. Then, "[a]ll of a sudden—Bam—he was right in [her] face, and he ha[d] a knife
right in front of [her].5' R366:107.
Defendant stood close to Teresa, held the knife approximately two feet from her face,
and ordered her to open the cash register. R366:108. Teresa stepped back, and defendant
repeated his demand, "No, you open the drawer." R366:108. Defendant positioned himself
to Teresa's side, continuing to hold the knife in her face while she opened the cash drawer.
R366:108-09. Teresa removed a pile of ones from the register, and as she handed them to
defendant, he warned her, "Don'tyoulookatme." R366:109. Teresa then handed defendant
a stack of fives, and all of the tens and twenties from the drawer. R366:109-10. Defendant
took the cash from her with one hand, and each time she handed him a stack, his hand
reappeared empty. R366:110.
Second aggravated robbery. After obtaining the cash from the register, defendant
turned his attention to Teresa's possessions. Id.

Still wielding his knife, defendant

demanded, "Now give me your keys." Id. When Teresa complied, defendant ordered, "Now
we are going in the back room," which "was when [Teresa] got scared," and froze.
R366:111. Defendant responded by telling Teresa that he was "not going to f ing hurt [her],
but [she was] going in the back room." R366:112. As defendant guided Teresa toward the
back room with the knife at her neck, he asked her what he could use to tie her up.
R366:112-13. Teresa said, "Look, it's slow. Nobody is here. You got my keys. You got

8

the money. You should just go." R366:112. She turned around, and defendant told her,
"You better f ing stay right there." R366:l 13. After Teresa promised to stay in the back
room for five minutes, defendant exited the store and fled in Teresa's 1995 teal-green Ford
Aspire. R366:113-14,116. Teresa estimated that around $500 or $600 had been stolen from
the register. R366:130. The store owner later reported that $1,105 was missing. R366:181.
Failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. Later that night, Officer Anderson
of the Salt Lake City Police Department, was informed of the robberies. R366:143. At about
2:00 a.m. that morning he spotted Teresa's stolen Ford Aspire, which defendant was driving
on 200 West. R3 66:144-45. Pulling behind the car, Officer Anderson activated his overhead
lights. R366:146. After the lights were activated, defendant accelerated and ltd Officer
Anderson on a pursuit along several downtown streets and through a motel parking lot,
finally entering an alley at 670 South. R366:148-49. Numerous times throughout the chase,
defendant opened the driver-side door, but closed it without exiting. R3 66:149. When
defendant turned onto 670 South, a dead end street, Officer Anderson thought that the pursuit
was over. Id Defendant, however, leaped from Teresa's vehicle and led Officer Anderson
on a foot chase, scaling a six-foot fence and dashing through the Red Lion parking lot.
R366:150. As Officer Anderson closed the distance between them, defendant glanced over
his shoulder and tripped over a curb along the driveway. R366:151. Unable to regain his
balance, defendant fell forward and slid along the pavement, allowing Officer Anderson to
take him into custody. Id.

9

After placing defendant under arrest, Officer Anderson noticed a bulge in defendant's
sock, and recovered a roll of cash. R366:154. The cash totaled $447 in denominations of
twenties, tens, fives, and ones. R366:171, 181.
A subsequent search of Teresa's car yielded a pack of COOL 100's cigarettes, a small
folding knife, and several bandanas like those sold at the store. R366:174. A search of
defendant's person yielded a Comdata card, a CR England Trucking card, and defendant's
temporary driver's license. R366:168; see also State's Exh. # 7.
Defense strategy. In his opening statement, trial counsel told the jury that defendant
fled from Officer Anderson, not because he was guilty of the aggravated robberies, but
because he had an outstanding warrant: "[W]hy does a person do something like that? Well,
[defendant] had a warrant out of Louisiana. He had written a bad check back home and knew
that there was an outstanding warrant." R366:92. Thereafter, on direct examination of the
officer, the prosecutor elicited that of the approximately "dozen" foot chases Officer
Anderson had been involved in, the suspects "typically" claimed to have run "because they
thought they had warrants." R366:155. On cross-examination of Officer Anderson, trial
counsel elicited that the officer arrested defendant for "aggravated robbery, possession of a
stolen vehicle, felony fleeing, resisting arrest[] and an NCIC hit." R366:158. Upon further
examination, Officer Anderson affirmed that an "NCIC hit," is "the same as having a
warrant." Id.

10

Based on Officer Anderson's testimony, the prosecutor argued that while it was true
defendant had an outstanding warrant when he fled, that fact was merely a "convenient
excuse": "You heard the officer testify they all say they have warrants, that's why he ran.
I think he ran for another reason, because he was in a stolen car, because he had taken it
earlier that night." R367:35. Trial counsel, on the other hand, maintained that defendant fled
because of the outstanding warrant:
[CJounsel has stated that, well, they all say they have warrants, so that's not a
valid reason. I don't know if that's true or not, but in this case there was a
warrant. He did have a warrant, and that's why he ran. He panicked. You
know, I don't know what happened in other cases, but we know what
happened in this case, he had a warrant. He had a warrant that he knew about.
R367:36-37.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to merge his aggravated
robbery convictions for punishment purposes. Defendant was convicted for aggravated
robbery under two different subsections of the aggravated robbery statute. Specifically,
count I charged defendant with robbing a convenience store using a dangerous weapon, and
count II charged defendant with then taking the store clerk's personal vehicle, which he used
to flee the scene. The aggravated robberies of the convenience store and of the clerk were
thus part of a single criminal episode, as defendant claims, but they also involved different
victims, elements, and acts, i.e., the underlying robbery, plus using a dangerous weapon, and

11

taking an automobile. Accordingly, defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery do not
constitute the same act and they are not subject to merger for punishment purposes.
Point 11(A). Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel for not
objecting to dangerous weapon enhancements. The dangerous weapon enhancement statute
comports with federal and state double jeopardy protections; therefore, as recently recognized
by this Court, any objection to the weapon enhancement on those grounds would have been
futile. See State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 45. Defendant's first
assertion of ineffectiveness thus fails as a matter of law.
Point 11(B). Trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to allegedly improper
anecdotal statistical evidence. Defendant asserts on appeal that trial counsel should have
objected to Officer Anderson's testimony—that most suspects apprehended following a foot
chase typically claim to have fled because they had warrants. Although trial counsel did not
object to the evidence, he did strategically argue in closing that the jury in this case knew for
a fact that defendant had an outstanding warrant when he fled. Moreover, defendant, opened
the door to Officer Anderson's testimony when trial counsel asserted in his opening
statement that defendant fled because he had a warrant, not because he was guilty of the
charged offenses. Defendant does not assert that the this strategy was unreasonable. Rather,
he acknowledges in his brief that trial counsel's argument was strategic, or to show that
defendant "had a reason to flee from police other than guilt." Aplt. Br. at 38. Given the
defense strategy, the prosecutor was entitled to adduce evidence that would minimize the

12

effect of defendant's evidence. Officer Anderson's testimony was therefore unobj ectionable.
Defendant's claim of deficient performance for not objecting to the testimony therefore fails
as a matter of law.
Even if Officer Anderson's testimony should have been excluded, defendant has not
and cannot establish unfair prejudice. The jury did not convict here because of Officer
Anderson's testimony, but rather because defendant matched the description of the robber
and was apprehended driving the store clerk's stolen vehicle. He was also found in
possession of almost $500 in small bills and other items like those taken from the
convenience store. Thus, defendant cannot establish the second, or prejudice prong of the
ineffectiveness standard and his claim should therefore be rejected.
Point III. Defendant's claim of an illegal sentence fails because in claiming that his
aggravated robbery convictions should have merged, defendant is really challenging the
underlying convictions and not the sentences given thereon. Therefore, there is no issue of
an illegal sentence in this case.

13

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE TWO JURY
CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY MERGED FOR
PUNISHMENT PURPOSES, BECAUSE THEY WERE BASED ON
DIFFERENT ACTS AND ELEMENTS, AND INVOLVED DIFFERENT
VICTIMS
In Point I of his brief, defendant alleges that his felony convictions for aggravated
robbery of the (1) convenience store, and of (2) the store clerk, Teresa Celis, should be
merged. Aplt. Br. at 14 ("This Court should merge [defendant's] aggravated robbery
convictions") (holding and capitalization omitted). In defendant's view, "the two aggravated
robbery charges stemmed from a single criminal episode," and were also "'incident to the
accomplishment of a single criminal objective, namely to [rob the convenience store] and
avoid being caught.'" Aplt. Br. at 17 (quoting State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah App.
1990) (brackets in original)).3

Defendant thus opines that the aggravated robberies

constituted "a single act conducted with a single intent," Aplt. Br. at 18, for which he "could
only be prosecuted once" under the single criminal episode statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1 402(1) (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 17. In other words, defendant alleges he was charged,

3

Defendant borrows language from the Lopez opinion, but that case does not
involve merging separate convictions for purposes of punishment as defendant requests.
Rather, the issue in Lopez was whether the trial court should have granted Lopez's
motion to sever charges of murder and child abuse. 789 P.2d at 42-44. The Court held
that the offenses were properly joined in a single prosecution. Id.
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convicted, and punished twice for the same offense.4 Because the evidence here clearly
shows that defendant committed two different acts that required proof of different elements,
and thus constituted two different offenses, his claim lacks merit and should be rejected.
Single criminal episode statute. The single criminal episode statute, or section 76-1402(1) provides that
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the
act shall be punishable under only one such provision . . . 5
There is no dispute here that the State relied upon separate acts to convict defendant for the
aggravated robberies of the convenience store and of the store clerk. However, defendant
asserts that he acted "with a single intent" in committing these acts, and therefore, "there was
'one offense and the multiple ownership of the property taken is immaterial.5" Aplt. Br. at
18. Defendant's claim is foreclosed by State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179,72 P.3d 69, where
4

To the extent that defendant hints that he is entitled to relief under the state and
federal constitutions, see Aplt. Br. at 14, his claims are unpreserved because he asserted
neither constitution in the trial court. See R292-302 (motion and memorandum); R367:57
(oral motion); R368 (motion hearing). See Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^ 14,122
P.3d 506 ("[W]e are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not
been properly preserved, framed, and briefed."), rev'don other grounds, 124 S.Ct. 1943
(2006). Moreover, defendant asserts no exception to the preservation rule. See State v.
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 23, 128 P.3d 1171 (refusing to infer a plain error argument); State
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (same).
5

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601(1) (West 2004), defines "Act" as
movement." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-401 (West 2004), defines

"a voluntary
bodily
a "single criminal
episode" as "all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective."
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this Court clarified that the single criminal episode statute, section 76-1-402(1), "applies"
only "to cases where 'the same acf can be punished under different provisions.'55 Smith,
2003 UT App 179, 72 P.3d 692, \ 19. Where, as here, however, separate acts require proof
of different elements they constitute separate offenses under section 76-1-402(1). Smith,
2003 UT App 179420(discussing^atev.^wa^z,736P.2d 1040,1041 (UtahApp. 1987)).
In other words, a defendant may be prosecuted and punished for all crimes committed within
a single criminal episode so long as they each arise from separate acts. See State v. O'Brien,
721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986) (referring to the first paragraph of section 76-1-402(1)). See
also State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (holding that "[t]he provision in
section 76-1-402(1) against double punishment for a single act [was] inapplicable55 where
Porter committed "two distinct burglaries55 (laundry room and apartment in the same
building), albeit "during a single criminal episode55). Cf. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,
Tf 16, 994 P.2d 1243 (clarifying that "the inquiry whether one crime is a lesser included
offense of a greater crime under section 76-l-402[(3)(a)], turns on the statutorily defined
elements of the two crimes55).
Aggravated robbery statute. A review of the aggravated robbery statute, UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-302(1) (West 2004), demonstrates that the offense can be committed three

different ways:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing a robbery,
he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601;
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(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.6
Defendant was charged and convicted under subsections (l)(a) and (l)(c): Count I charged
defendant with using a knife to rob the convenience store of its cash, see section 76-63 02( 1)(a), and Count II charged defendant with then taking the store clerk's personal vehicle,
see section 76-6-3 02(1 )(c). The distinction between the charges was made clear in the
information as well as throughout the trial and in closing argument. See, e.g., R29A-29C,
R251-52,R367:33-34.
Based on the above, even assuming the aggravated robberies of the convenience store
and of the store clerk were part of a single criminal episode, they were also separate and
distinct acts involving different victims and elements, i.e., the underlying robbery of the
convenience store, plus using or threatening the use of a knife, and taking an automobile.
See section 76-1-601; 76-6-302(l)(a) & (c); see also O'Brien, 721 P.2d at 900 (rejecting
defendants claims that because their crimes of aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated robbery, and theft of firearms were committed during a single criminal episode
they were only subject to one punishment). As such, the aggravated robberies of the
convenience store and of Teresa Celis constitute distinct and separate offenses that are not
6

§ 76-6-301 (West 2004) defines robbery as an "unlawfiil[] and
[intentional[] tak[ing] or attemt[ed] tak[ing of] personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or
fear, and with a purpose of intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the
personal property;55 or an "intentional[] or knowing[] use[] [of] fear of immediate force
against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation.55
UTAH CODE ANN.
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subject to merger forpunishment purposes under section 76-1-402(1). See, e.g., Smith, 2003
UT App 179, Tff 19-20 (holding Smith's convictions for (1) failure to file a tax return and (2)
willful evasion of income tax were separate acts requiring proof of different elements and
constituted separate offenses not subject to merger under section 76-1-402(1)); State v.
Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah App. 1989) (holding Mane's conduct in shooting and killing
first victim, firing at a second victim, and then turning and running, and stopping to fire at
a third victim, were distinct voluntary acts not subject to merger); Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040,
1042 (Utah App. 1987) (holding that when Suarez "placed his mouth on the victim's
breasts," "and then placed his hand on her vagina," he committed two separate acts requiring
proof of different elements under the forcible sexual abuse statute, which acts thus
constituted separate offenses).
Defendant's authorities are not to the contrary. Defendant cites, among other cases,
State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), andStote v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996),
in support of his claim that his convictions for aggravated robbery amount to a single
criminal violation for punishment purposes. Kimbel and Crosby, however, apply the single
larceny rule, a merger doctrine adopted by the Utah Supreme Court and other courts that in
theft cases, there is only one offense if there is only "one intention, one general impulse, and
one plan, even though there is a series of transactions." Kimbel, 620 P.2d at 518 (two thefts
of same type of property on same day from same victim constituted single offense); Crosby,
927 P.2d at 645-46 (three counts of theft consolidated where defendant's thefts were part of
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a single plan; but separate forgery count left standing); People v. Bailey, 360 P.2d 39, 42
(Cal. 1961). The purpose of the single larceny rule, which has not been extended beyond
theft or embezzlement cases, "is to prevent the aggregation of criminal penalties for a single
act and stems from the presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of the
penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment." State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694,
696 (Utah 1981) (holding prosecution could not aggregate sixteen counts of misdemeanor
vandalism into a single felony offense); see also State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,390 (Utah
App. 1997). In Patience, this Court refused to apply the single larceny rule to forgery cases
even if the forgeries were committed in the course of a continuous transaction, holding
instead that a defendant could be convicted for each document forged. Id. at 390-91.
Indeed, while the Supreme Court in Crosby required the theft charges in that case to be
consolidated, it did not preclude the separate conviction of a single forgery charge, even
though it appears the objective was the same, i.e., to misappropriate company funds. See
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 645-46. In short, the single larceny rule is a narrow exception to section
76-1 -402. Defendant has not demonstrated that the exception is warranted in this aggravated
robbery context.
Defendant alternatively asserts that even assuming that the single larceny rule does
not require merger of his aggravated robbery convictions, "there was only one victim of an
act of violence"—Teresa Celis—and therefore "there was only one offense." Aplt. Br. at
19. Defendant cites no authority for this proposition that only persons who suffer an act of
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violence constitute victims under the aggravated robbery statute, and the State is aware of
none. To the contrary, the sentencing statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-20l(l)(e)(i) (West
2004), defines a "victim" as "any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." See also UTAH CODE ANN. 7738a-102(14)(a) (West 2004) (Crime Victims Restitution Act applying same definition).
Thus, while the convenience store owner was not personally present at the time of the
aggravated robberies, he is nonetheless a victim of defendant's criminal activity for purposes
of charging and punishing defendant.
In sum, defendant committed two separate voluntary acts when he robbed the
convenience store using a dangerous weapon anddlso took the store clerk's personal vehicle.
These separate acts required proof of different elements, in addition to the underlying
robbery: (1) use of a dangerous weapon, and (2) taking of an operable motor vehicle. Section
76-6-302(l)(a) & (c). They thus constitute separate offenses under section 76-6-302(l)(a)
& (c), as well as separate acts under sections 76-1-601 and 76-1-402(1). Accordingly,
defendant fails to show that his aggravated robbery convictions should have been merged for
punishment purposes under section 76-1-402(1).
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POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT TRIAL COUNSEL
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE FOR NOT OBJECTING
TO DANGEROUS WEAPON ENHANCEMENTS AND TO
ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER ANECDOTAL STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not
raising federal and state double jeopardy objections to the dangerous weapon enhancements
imposed under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 19-34. In Point
11(B) of his brief, defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
Officer Anderson's testimony that in the officer's experience, suspects apprehended
following a foot chase typically claim to have run because they thought they had warrants.
Aplt. Br. at 34-39. Both of defendant's claims lack merit and should be rejected.
Ineffective assistance standard. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant "must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that
it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984)).

Defendant must also "show that counsel's deficient performance was

prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. The first part of defendant's
burden requires that he "rebut the strong presumption that 'under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'"Id. (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689) (other internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If defendant fails to
establish either deficient performance or prejudice, his claim of ineffective assistance of
21

counsel fails as a matter of law. State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993). "Given
the arduous nature of the defendant's burden, ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely
succeed." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993).
A.

Utah's dangerous weapon enhancement statute comports
with federal and state double jeopardy protections;
therefore, as recently recognized in State v. Alfatlawi, any
objection on those grounds would have been futile.

"To establish a claim of ineffectiveness based on an oversight or misreading of law,
a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the
time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). In other words, counsel's performance must be assessed on his
"perspective at the time." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,523 (2003) (quotation and citation
omitted). "[CJlairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective representation." Bullock v.
Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1093 (2002) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Thus, counsel cannot be found to have performed deficiently
"for failing to predict future law." Id. Yet, that is precisely what defendant asserts his trial
counsel failed to do when he raised no double jeopardy objections to the dangerous weapon
enhancements in this case. Aplt. Br. at 19-39.
On 21 December 2006, ten days after defendant filed his brief on appeal, this Court
issued State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ffif 37-44, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 45. See Aplt.
Br. at 41 (mailing certificate signed 11 December 2006). Alfatlawi, also an ineffectiveness
case, upholds the dangerous weapon enhancement statute against the same claims of double
22

jeopardy defendant now asserts his trial counsel should have raised in this case. 2006 UT
App 511,fflf37-43. Given the result in Alfatlawi, trial counsel can hardly be faulted for his
non-objection to the dangerous weapon enhancements in this case. Id. at U 43.
Indeed, Alfatlawi, like defendant, was convicted for aggravated robbery (six counts).7
2006 UT App 511, f 8. On appeal, Alfatlawi, like defendant, asserted that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object—on federal and state double jeopardy grounds—to the
dangerous weapon enhancements imposed under section 76-3-203.8. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT
App 511, \ 37. This Court rejected Alfatlawi's claims, holding that section 76-3-203.8 did
not violate federal double jeopardy protections. Id. at f 39. As recognized by the Court, at
sentencing, the "Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court
from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." Id. (quoting Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)). The Court further noted that "in Hunter, the United
States Supreme Court determined that dangerous weapon enhancement statutes do not violate
the Fifth Amendment^ . . . if the legislature specifically authorized cumulative punishment
for a crime committed with a dangerous weapon." Id. Turning to the plain language of
section 76-3-203.8, the Court held that it was consistent with federal double jeopardy law
because the legislature clearly intended for the dangerous weapon enhancement to impose
cumulative punishments. Id. at \ 40. "[T]he plain language of section 76-3-203.8 states that
' [i]f the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in

7

Alfatlawi was also convicted for one count of aggravated burglary. Id. at f 8.
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the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court . . . shall increase by one year the
minimum term of the sentence applicable by law.'" Id. (quoting section 76-3-203.8(2))
(brackets in original). This Court recognized that "this language unambiguously states that
the legislature intended to make it mandatory for trial courts to increase prison terms where
the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a dangerous weapon
while committing a felony."Id. Consequently, the Court determined that section 76-3-203.8
comports with federal double jeopardy law. Id.
This Court further held that even assuming that the language of section 76-3-203.8
was ambiguous, the legislative history supported the conclusion that the dangerous weapon
enhancement did not violate federal double jeopardy law. As noted, at sentencing, the
Double Jeopardy Clause requires only that the legislative "intent [was] to authorize
cumulative punishment for a single act." Id. at \ 41. Here, review of the legislative history
expressly showed that the "purpose of the legislation was to assist law enforcement and 'get[]
tougher on violent criminals' by increasing prison terms." Id. (quoting Floor Debate on H.B.
185, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bresnahan)).8

8

The legislative floor debates show that changing the word "firearm" to
"dangerous weapon" only "broaden[ed] the ability of our law enforcement people to deal
with the ever-increasing problem of violent crime." Recording of the proceeding of the
49th Legislature, presentation of H.B. 185 to Utah House, Day 44, February 28, 1995
(transcribed by Lee Nakamura, secretary Utah Attorney General's Office) (Addendum
D). Rep. Bresnahan further explained that "dangerous weapon" depended on "the way the
weapon is used." Id. "So, in other words, 'a dangerous weapon,' for those that have had
concerns, is not just simply that you've got a pocketknife in your pocket, it depends on
how you use it. So, anything could be 4a dangerous weapon' if you use it as such." Id.
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Finally, this Court held that section 76-3-203.8 also comported with state double
jeopardy protections as well. Id. at %A2 (citing UTAH CONST, art. I5 § 12). Although Utah's
"double jeopardy clause has been interpreted differently than the Fifth Amendment's double
jeopardy clause, [the Court] could find no authority distinguishing Utah law from federal law
respecting cumulative sentences." Id. The Court further noted that the Utah Supreme Court
had previously upheld "cumulative punishment on crimes committed with firearms[.]" Id.
(discussing State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah 1978) and the former firearm
enhancement statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 (1978)). This Court thus reached the
same conclusion with regard to "the current dangerous weapon enhancement statute," section
76-3-203.8. Id.9
Having determined that section 76-3-203.8 comports with both federal and state
double jeopardy protections, the Court concluded that Alfatlawi's trial counsel "did not
perform ineffectively for failing to challenge the enhancement." Id. at % 43. The Court
expressly rejected Alfatlawi's characterization of the double jeopardy issue as an "open
question,"—the same characterization asserted by defendant here—on the ground that "[t]he

9

In holding that the dangerous weapon enhancement did not violate state double
jeopardy protections, the Court expressly rejected Alfatlawi's invitation—the same as that
of defendant in this case—to "adopt the analysis of the Montana Supreme Court in State
v. Guillaume, 975 P.2d 312 (Mont. 1999)." Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, % 42 n.5. In
addition to emphasizing that it was not bound to follow a sister state court, the Court
expressly rejected the Montana rationale in favor of that of the United States Supreme
Court. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 42 n.5 (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366).
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cases governing double jeopardy in Utah are well settled." Id. at ^f 43 n.6 (citations omitted).
Because Alfatlawi failed to show any deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel,
the Court determined there was no need to consider the second or prejudice prong of the
ineffective assistance analysis. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 43.
In sum, if as Alfatlawi instructs, federal and state double jeopardy law was wellsettled before to Alfatlawi, it is even more well-settled after Alfatlawi.

Accordingly,

defendant's claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise futile double
jeopardy objections identical to those disposed of m Alfatlawi should be rejected. See State
v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, | 34, 989 P.2d 52 ("The failure of counsel to make motions or
objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance"
(quotations, citation, and alteration omitted)). If Alfatlawi's trial counsel did not perform
deficiently, trial counsel here did not.
B.

The defense strategy was to argue that defendant fled
because he had a warrant, not because he was guilty of the
charged offenses; therefore, any objection to Officer
Anderson's testimony that ninety percent of suspects claim
to flee because of warrants would have been futile.

As noted above, defendant also claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by not objecting to Officer Anderson's testimony—that suspects apprehended
following a foot chase typically claim to have fled because they had warrants. Aplt. Br. at
34-39; see also R366:155. According to defendant, Officer Anderson's testimony constituted
"foundationless anecdotal statistical evidence," and was thus inadmissible under rule 403,
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Utah Rules of Evidence, State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), and State v. Iorg, 801
P.2d 938 (Utah App. 1990). Aplt. Br. at 38; see also Aplt. Br. at 35-36. Defendant further
asserts that there was "no strategic reason for allowing the State to admit the anecdotal
statistical testimony without qualifying Officer Anderson as an expert, providing any
foundation, or demonstrating how the probative value of the evidence could possibly
outweigh its prejudicial effect." Aplt. Br. at 37 (citing R366:155).10 Defendant's claim lacks
merit and should be rejected.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to object, a defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating that "'no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be
surmised from counsel's actions.'" State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d461,468 (Utah App. 1993)
(citing State v. Moritzky, 111 P.3d 688,692 (Utah App. 1989)). "Moreover,'[the reviewing
court] will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed
those choices might appear in retrospect.'" Id. at 465 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Where "a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or
has led the trial court into error, we will then decline to save that party from the error.'" State
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 3421-43 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158
(Utah 1989)) (refusing to consider plain error claim). See also State v. Jiminez, 2007 UT

10

Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
27

App 116,1ffi 11-12,

P.3d

(concluding trial counsel's non-objection was reasonable

strategy and refusing to consider plain error claim).
1. No deficient performance. Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective
for not objecting to Officer Anderson's alleged "foundationless anecdotal statitstical
evidence," Aplt. Br. at 38, fails at the outset because trial counsel strategically chose to deal
with this evidence in his argument to the jury. As set out in the Statement of the Facts, supra,
trial counsel argued in closing that whatever the prosecutor may think about why defendant
fled, defendant really did have an outstanding warrant when he fled from police the night of
the aggravated robberies:
[C]ounsel has stated that, well, they all say they have warrants, so that's not a
valid reason. I don't know if that's true or not, but in this case there was a
warrant. He did have a warrant, and that's why he ran. He panicked. You
know, I don't know what happened in other cases, but we know what
happened in this case, he had a warrant. He had a warrant that he knew about.
R367:36-37.
The record thus shows that trial counsel made a conscious decision to not object to
Officer Anderson's testimony as part of a reasonable trial strategy to explain to the jury why
defendant fled from police. That strategy was supported by the fact that defendant, in fact,
had an outstanding warrant. See R366:158. Given this strategy, counsel had no reason to
object to anecdotal information that most suspects claim to have outstanding warrants when
they are apprehended following a chase. See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468, 465. Trial
counsel's argument was also consistent with the trial court's jury instruction that although
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"consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight, it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt
of the crime charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence."
R275.
Additionally, defendant's claim of ineffectiveness fails because defendant opened the
door to the challenged evidence. In his opening statement, trial counsel told the jury that
defendant fled because he had an outstanding Louisiana warrant, not because he was guilty
of the aggravated robberies. See R366:92. The prosecutor responded by eliciting that ninety
percent of the suspects Officer Anderson had arrested following a foot chase claimed to have
run because of warrants. R366:155. As noted above, on cross-examination, trial counsel
elicited that one of the reasons Officer Anderson arrested defendant in this case was because
defendant, in fact, had an outstanding warrant. R366:158. As defendant acknowledges in
his brief, trial counsel did so in order to argue to the jury that "he had a reason to flee from
police other than guilt." Aplt. Br. at 38 (citing R366:92; R367:36-37). Accordingly, as
further noted above, in closing, trial counsel argued that he didn't know about all the other
suspects apprehended by Officer Anderson, "but in this case there was a warrant." R367:36.
Trial counsel emphasized that the jury knew defendant had an outstanding warrant, and that
that was the reason defendant fled from Officer Anderson. Id. at 36-37.
Given this record, even if trial counsel had obj ected that Officer Anderson's testimony
regarding ninety percent of apprehended suspects was "foundationless anecdotal statistical
evidence," Aplt. Br. at 38, as defendant now claims he should have done, that objection
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would have been unsuccessful. Defendant claims that trial counsel should have objected
under rule 403, Rammel, and Iorg. Aplrt. Br. at 35-36. In both Rammel and Iorg, the
defendants were convicted for sexual child abuse, and the concern was that the challenged
witnesses "used [their] 'anecdotal statistical experience' with late reporting in sexual abuse
cases to conclude that late reporting does not mean a victim is not telling the truth." Iorg, 801
P.2d at 941 (discussing Rammel). Even assuming arguendo that Officer Anderson's
testimony was objectionable under Rammel and Iorg, however, trial counsel still would not
have been successful in raising any objection under these cases, or under rule 403, because
trial counsel opened the door to the officer's testimony.11
Specifically, when trial counsel asserted that defendant fled because of an outstanding
Louisiana warrant, see R366:92, he necessarily invited the prosecutor's subsequent elicitation
of evidence that ninety percent of apprehended suspects claim to have fled because of
warrants, see R366:155. "It is proper to allow . . . any testimony which would tend to

n

In any event, Officer Anderson's testimony was not objectionable under
Rammel, Iorg, or rule 403. This is because Officer Anderson related his experience with
the claim of warrants made by suspects apprehended following a foot chase, but unlike
the witnesses in Rammel and Iorg, he was not asked to opine whether he had concluded
that claim meant the suspects had fabricated the reason for their flight, or more
specifically, that defendant was fabricating the excuse here. See R366:155. Rather, in
this case, the prosecutor drew this reasonable inference from Officer Anderson's
testimony in argument to the jury, see R367:35, which argument defendant does not
challenge. See Aplt. Br. at 34-39. As set for above, defendant responded with an
argument of his own. R366:36-37. Having failed to establish that Officer Anderson's
testimony was objectionable under Rammel or Iorg, defendant necessarily fails to
establish that it was prejudicial under rule 403.
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dispute, explain or minimize the effect of evidence that has been given by one's opponent."
State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, f 18, 136 P.3d 1261 (quoting State v. Sanders, 27 Utah
2d 354,496 P.2d 270,274 (1972)). Therefore, because trial counsel asserted that defendant
fled because of a warrant, and not because he was guilty, see R366:92, the prosecutor was
entitled to "minimize" the argument by eliciting evidence that defendant's claim was one
made by most suspects apprehended following a chase. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, ^18.
Officer Anderson's testimony was thus admissible here, even assuming that it was otherwise
objectionable:
The law wisely permits evidence not otherwise admissible to be offered to
explain or rebut evidence elicited by the defendant himself. Where one party
introduces evidence as to a particular fact or transaction, the other party is
entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though
such latter evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered
initially.
State v. Norman, 562 S.E.2d 453, 459 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quotation marks and case
citation omitted).
Moreover, as recently recognized by this Court, relevant and probative evidence is not
properly excluded under rule 403 merely on the ground that it is also prejudicial:
Since all effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the
party against whom it is offered, prejudice which calls for exclusion is given
a more specialized meaning: an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as bias,
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror.
Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84,17,

P.3d

(quoting State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d

981, 984 (Utah 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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Officer Anderson's testimony was highly probative of the defense strategy to
emphasize that defendant had an outstanding warrant when he fled. Officer Anderson's
testimony did not contain any information that "would likely create feelings of 'bias,
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror,' in the fact finder, or information that
would otherwise shift the fact finder's attention away" from resolving the case, i.e.,
determining whether the State had shown defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Even if there was a "remote possibility" that the officer's testimony would have led the jury
to render a decision on an improper basis, that possibility still would not have been a basis
for exclusion: "The mere fact that evidence possesses a tendency to suggest a decision on an
improper basis does not require exclusion; evidence may be excluded only if the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the proffered evidence." Id.
at Tf 8 (quoting Maurer, 110 P.2d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(emphasis in original)).
Given all of the above, particularly the reasonable defense strategy to emphasize
defendant's warrant, it necessarily follows that trial counsel would not have succeeded in
excluding Officer Anderson's testimony under Rammel, Iorg, or rule 403. The officer's
testimony had high probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
any unfair prejudice. See Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84, ^ 7-8. Because the defense
strategy necessarily opened the door to Officer Anderson's testimony, any objection would
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have been futile.12 Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34. Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness thus
fails as a matter of law. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,ffl[16-17.
2. No prejudice. In any event, even assuming Officer Anderson's testimony should
have been excluded here, defendant fails to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice.
Defendant was not convicted because Officer Anderson testified that ninety percent of
suspects apprehended following a foot chase claim to have run because of warrants. Rather,
the jury convicted defendant because he fit the description of the robber, a^dbecause he was
apprehended driving the clerk's stolen automobile. R366:l 14, 151. He was also found in
possession of $447 in denominations of twenties, tens, fives, and ones, a Comdata card, a CR
England Trucking card, a pack of COOL 100's cigarettes, a small folding knife, and several
bandanas like those sold at the store. R366:168, 171, 174, 181; see also State's Exh. # 7.
Accordingly, defendant fails to show that there was a reasonable probability of a different
outcome absent Officer Anderson's testimony. He thus fails to meet the second, or prejudice,
prong of the ineffectiveness standard. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, *[fl[ 16-17.

12

Although defendant challenges trial counsel's non-objection to Officer
Anderson's testimony, he does not challenge the reasonableness of the defense strategy of
emphasizing that he in fact had an outstanding warrant. See Aplt. Br. at 38. ("In order to
prove his defense, [defendant] took the enormous gamble of introducing evidence of his
outstanding warrant. R366:158 . . . Because he knew he had an outstanding warrant, he
had a reason to flee from police other than guilt" (case citation omitted)). According to
defendant, "the State robbed [him] of the force of his gamble by introducing
foundationaless anecdotal statistical evidence to suggest [that he] must have been lying
about the reason he fled[.]" Aplt. Br. at 38-39.
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POINT III
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCES ARE NOT ILLEGAL UNDER RULE
22(e), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the Court should reverse "the trial
court's imposition of the dangerous weapon enhancements" because they "resulted in an
illegal sentence." Aplt. Br. at 39 (capitalization and holding omitted). Defendant claims that
his two enhanced first degree felony sentences of six-years-to-life for his aggravated robbery
convictions violate the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitute, because,
as he claimed in Point I of his brief, the two aggravated robberies should merge under section
76-1-402(1). Aplt. Br. at 39. Defendant asserts that the alleged sentencing errors should be
corrected pursuant to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Aplt. Br. at 39.
Rule 22(e) provides that a "court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." See State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^ 5, 48 P.3d
228 (noting that "because an illegal sentence is void," a rule 22(e) claim "may be raised at
any time") (citation omitted and internal punctuation omitted). However, in State v. Brooks,
908 P.2d 856, 859, (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court held that "an appellate court may
not review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(e) when the substance of the appeal is, as
it is here, a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction." Brooks,
like defendant, challenged his sentences on the ground that "'his convictions for robbery and
burglary illegally punish[ed] him twice for the same crime.'" Id. (brackets in original)
(quotingState v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 823-26 (Utah App. 1994)). Because defendant, like
34

Brooks before him, alleges that his underlying convictions for aggravated robbery should
merge, he is substantively challenging those convictions and not his sentences. Accordingly,
rule 22(e) does not apply. Id. Defendant's enhanced sentences should therefore be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's jury convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of
failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _//_ April 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

RIAN DECKER
ssistant Attorney General
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
:
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO VACATE
CONVICTION FOR
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

Case No. 051904377

ROY DRAKE IRVIN JR,
Defendant.

:

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

:

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel of record Nyal C. Bodily and hereby
moves the Court to vacate Defendant's conviction for Aggravated Robbery, found in Count Two
of the Information filed against Defendant. Defendant's motion is based on the accompanying
memorandum. Defendant moves the Court to vacate the conviction on Count Two of the
information for the reason that the convictions for Counts One and Two are properly subject to
merger pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-1-402 and Utah caselaw.

WHEREFORE, Defendant moves the Court for a finding that Counts One and Two of the
information filed in this case are subject to the Merger Doctrine and an order that Defendant's
conviction for Count Two-Aggravated Robbery be vacated.
DATED April 7, 2006.

OL:
Nyal 6; Bodily
ALLAN & EASTON, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Suiane Voyles, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion to Vacate Conviction for Aggravated Robbery and Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Vacate to:
George Vo-Duc
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
^th

DATED this 10m day of April 2006.

JflOL
,e Voyles
AN & EAST'

T^d

Judicial District
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ALLAN & EASTON, LLC
NYALC. BODILY #9621
1892 North 1120 West
Provo, UT 84604
(801)375-8800
(801) 375-8802 (fax)

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
:
Plaintiff,
:

vs.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE CONVICTION

Case No. 051904377

ROY DRAKE IRVIN, JR.,
Defendant.

:

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

:

Comes now Defendant, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion
to Vacate Conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In an Amended Information filed July 7, 2005, Defendant was charged as follows:
Count One - Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of U.C.A.
§76-6-302,

^n^

Count Two - Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of U.C.A.
§76-6-302,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
Count Two - Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-404,
Count Three - Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree
felony, in violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-210.
2.

At the preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over on all charges and the case
set for trial.

3.

At the jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all counts, including Count Two Aggravated Robbery. The jury was not instructed on the alternate theory of Theft,
the Court having found that there was no evidence to establish that a theft
occurred separate and distinct from the Aggravated Robbery.

4.

After the jury returned "Guilty" verdicts on all counts, Defendant moved the
Court to merge Counts One and Two. The Court allowed the parties to brief the
issue.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY ARE
SUBJECT TO MERGER BECAUSE THE CHARGES AROSE FROM A
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE.

Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery are subject to merger because the
charges arise from a single criminal episode. U.C.A. §76-1-401 defines a "single criminal

Vb

episode" as, "all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Further, U.C.A. §76-1-402 provides that,
"A defendant may by prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under
different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision . . . "
In this case, the crimes with which Defendant is charged arose from a single criminal episode
because Defendant's conduct in the two charges of Aggravated Robbery were closely related in
time and incident to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Indeed, at trial the evidence presented showed that Defendant had contact with only one
person during the course of the robbery: Teresa Celis. Ms. Celis was ordered at knife point to
hand over the cash in the register and was then told to give up the keys to her car. After being
told to wait in the back room, Ms. Celis heard her car being driven away from the store where
she was working. The evidence presented showed that Defendant entered the store on foot, took
the money and then left in Ms. Celis' car. The evidence further showed that there was no break
in the sequence of events from the taking of the money to the taking of the car. The scenario
presented is so common that it strains reason to contend that the acts charged do not amount to a
single criminal episode, where there was a single criminal objective.
In State v. Bair, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether subsequent theft by
receiving prosecutions of a defendant who possessed stolen firearms belonging to two different
victims was permissible in light of the "single criminal episode" statute. The court found that the

crimes alleged against the defendant charged him with receiving stolen property and that the
receipt of the weapons had occurred in a single act. The court concluded that, "In light of the
aforestated facts, we conclude that the offenses allegedly committed by defendant for which he
was prosecuted in the first and second (present) prosecutions were closely related in time and
pursuant to a single criminal objective. Accordingly, we hold that the present prosecution is
precluded by the single criminal episode statute." 671 P.2d 203 at 208 (1983). In Bair, the
prosecution charged the defendant under the theory that where there were two victims and two
firearms, the defendant could be charged with two crimes. The Supreme Court's reasoning in
denying the State's claim is applicable here. There was a single criminal episode with a single
criminal objective and therefore while there are offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of the code, there should only be one count of Aggravated
Robbery for which Defendant is to be punished.
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY ARE
SUBJECT TO MERGER BECAUSE ALTHOUGH THE STATE HAS PLEAD
DIFFERENT "THEORIES" FOR DIFFERENT CHARGES THERE WAS
REALLY A SINGLE CRIME SUBJECT TO TWO METHODS OF PROOF.
Defendant's convictions for Aggravated Robbery should merge because although the
State plead different legal theories as separate charges, there was a single crime committed,
which was subject to two methods of proof. Specifically, the State alleged in this case that
Defendant committed aggravated robbery by committing robbery and in the course of the
robbery 1) using a dangerous weapon, and 2) taking an operable motor vehicle. In State v.
Casias, the Court of Appeals examined a similar situation where the defendant was charged with

theft for stealing money with a value over $1000 and for stealing a firearm. 772 P.2d 975 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). In Casias, the court ordered that one of the theft convictions be vacated. The
court reasoned that U.C.A. §76-6-412 (the section categorizing theft for sentencing purposes
based on the value of the thing stolen or the nature of the thing stolen (either a motor vehicle or a
firearm)) did not outline elements of the crime of theft found at U.C.A. §76-6-404. IcL, at 978. In
Casias, the court examined several cases and statutes and found that in each case there were
separate and distinct elements, which had to be proved for each crime. The court also rejected the
State's attempt to analogize U.C.A. §76-6-412 to U.C.A. §76-5-404 (forcible sexual abuse). Id,,
at 978.
The charging scheme in this case is similar to that examined in Casias. Here, Defendant
was charged with the base crime of Robbery, which may be enhanced for sentencing purposes to
a first-degree felony when any of three aggravating factors are present, i.e. a) use or threatened
use of a dangerous weapon, b) causing serious bodily injury upon another, or c) the taking or
attempted taking of an operable motor vehicle. Given the evidence presented at trial, the State
had the choice of theories under which to prove that Defendant committed Aggravated Robbery,
either of which could have properly resulted in a conviction. However, the essential underlying
act was the robbery; the taking of personal property from another, with the intent to deprive the
person of the property, by the use of force or fear of force. Aggravated Robbery, then, permits
enhancement of the penalty for Robbery based on the character of the property taken or the
manner in which it was taken.

Therefore, Defendant's convictions for Aggravated Robbery should merge because there
was a single crime capable of proof under multiple theories.
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS ARE SUBJECT TO MERGER BECAUSE
THE COMMISSION OF ONE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WAS
INCIDENTAL TO AND PART OF THE OTHER AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.

Finally, Defendant's convictions should merge because the commission of one
aggravated robbery was incidental to the other aggravated robbery (if indeed there were two
robberies). Specifically, Defendant applies the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in State v.
Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), to justify the merger of the two counts of
Aggravated Robbery in this case. Finlayson, though not directly analogous to the facts of this
case, dealt with merger of charges of rape or forcible sodomy with aggravated kidnapping, where
the alleged kidnapping was merely incidental to the host charge. The court in Finlayson
developed a three part test to determine if the above-mentioned charges should merge.
Specifically, the court stated that,
"If a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of
another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement for confinement:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes
the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk
of detection. " I d at 289.
If we extend the reasoning of the Finlayson test and apply it generally to the facts of this

case we can draw several conclusions that favor merger of the Aggravated Robbery counts. First,
for a "taking" alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be a
separate crime, all parts of the Finlayson test must apply. Looking at part (b) of the test, certainly
the taking of a vehicle to facilitate a robbery is inherent in the nature of a robbery, as it is
anticipated in the Aggravated Robbery section. Also, a review of part (c) favors merger in this
case. The taking of a vehicle does not make the commission of the underlying robbery easier nor
does it lessen the risk of detention. Where a victim is left at the scene, as in this case, and is not
bound or restrained in any way and the vehicle is identifiable because it was taken from the
victim, the risk of detection to the defendant is greater than if the defendant had used his own or
another vehicle or left the scene on foot.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions for Aggravated Robbery should merge and Count 2 be vacated.
The acts for which Defendant was convicted were part of a single criminal episode. The events
were closely connected in time and were executed with a single criminal purpose and therefore
represent a single criminal act.
In addition, caselaw which is analogous to this case supports the conclusion that the
Aggravated Robbery statute provides alternate means of proving that an aggravated robbery has
occurred. The Aggravated Robbery statute allows enhancement of the Robbery statute for
sentencing purposes, but each enhancing factor does not create a new crime.
The reasoning in Finlayson supports the conclusion that only one aggravated robbery
occurred in this case. The addition of the taking of an operable motor vehicle is inherent in and

contemplated by the Aggravated Robbery statute and the taking of the vehicle in this case
specifically, does not make commission of the crime easier or lessen the risk of detection.
WHEREFORE, Defendant moves the Court for a finding that Counts One and Two of the
information filed in this case are subject to merger and an order that Defendant's conviction for
Count Two-Aggravated Robbery be vacated.
DATED April 10, 2006.

<L
Nyal c. Bodily
ALLAN & EASTON, LLC
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ROY DRAKE IRVIN, JR.,

)

Defendant.

)

BEFORE. THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1860

MOTION
MAY 11, 2006

FILED iiSTBiei COURT
Th' r d Judicial District

J&l
REPORTED BY:

Matthew B. Rose, RPR, CSR
(801) 238-7378

D^OJ'y Cicr''

HL£J

'TAH APPaUVTt COURTS
*!£ t 9 ?0Qfi

ORIGINAL
V»X

solely on the nature of what's taken.
And then the other point I want to make has to do
with the robbery statute itself.

The robbery statute requires

"taking from the person or immediate presence of the person by
force or fear."
money —

There was no force or fear used to take the

or to take the money from the person that that money

belonged to. And I don't know the gentleman's name, the store
owner, nothing was taken from him by force or fear.
be, as far as he is concerned, merely a theft.

That would

If money that

belonged to him was taken from him and the person had the
intent to permanently deprive him of it, there was a theft from
that person.
The only robbery that occurred was from the clerk.
The money that was in her care and the car that was hers and
that was one robbery.

A continuing course of conduct,

continuing fear where multiple things were taken, that's a
single robbery.
money.

It's not a robbery of the person who owned the

If anything, it's a theft.
THE COURT:

interesting question.

Okay.

Thank you.

Well, a very

I don't think the decision has to turn

on whether you have one or two victims, or whether you have a
victim who owns the money but wasn't there, or the property was
taken from the person who had the responsibility of the money,
an employee like in this case.

I don't think the decision

should turn on that.
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Whether there were two separate crimes that are
charged separately even though they may be in a single criminal
episode -- and I look at a single criminal episode is just a
procedural matter.

Single criminal episode you try them all at

once, if you can't you try them separately.

But it seems to me

the better rationale has to be here that certainly a robbery
has to occur, and it can only occur when the property is taken
from a person.
In this case we have a —

we have a robbery, and

Mr. Irvin came into the store and he took the property that was
owned by the store owner —

who wasn't there, but under the

care, custody or control of his employee who was there —
force or fear.

by

I agree with the State at that point in time,

that crime ends as far as the robbery is concerned.

If

something had have happened in the back room besides just
taking her keys, then everybody agrees it would be another
crime.

But at that point in time, after the force and fear are

necessary to get the cash out of the cash register is
concluded, he takes her in the back room, the force and fear
continues and she gives up the keys to her car.
Now, granted it's the same person from whom the
property was taken.

If it wasn't, the second charge wouldn't

be a robbery it would be something else.

But her property was

taken from her against her will by force or fear and that is
her automobile.

And I think that constitutes a separate crime.
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And the reason I do say that is in the circumstances
of this case, and each case turns on its own, factually anyway,
but it just seems to me once the initial crime is completed,
the robbery —

taking the money by force and fear —

is

completed and then there 's a second type of property taken
from —

in this case, this is her personal property, this isnft

her property that's being taken that she has charge of as an
and through force and fear, you!ve got a second

employee —
crime.

So accordingly I deny the defense motion,

It?s an

interesting question and perhaps it ought to be visited in the
appellate courts and they111 certainly tell me if it is or not.
I have no question about that.
deny the motion.

So in any event ITm going to

When I sentence on this matter I111 be

sentencing on two robberies.
I'll ask the State to prepare an order.

And please,

in the order set forth what I've said here as to why I think
State's position is correct so when the appellate court takes a
look at it if they choose to they can see the order without any
question and see why I did what I did.

And if I'm wrong, then

Ifm wrong.
MR. FISHER:
THE COURT:
pretty soon.

Yes, your Honor.
Thank you, gentleman.

I!ll see you

Sentencing is on the 9th of June?

Yes. Okay.

I111 see you then.
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MR. FISHER:

Very good, sir.

Thank you.

MR. BODILY:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 2:09
p.m. )
•

*

*
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

-vsROY DRAKE TRVIN, JR.,
Defendant.

Case No. 051904377FS
Hon. Timothy R. Hansen

This Court presided over trial in the above-entitled matter on March 28-29, 2006.
At the conclusion of that trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, including
two counts of Aggravated Robbery. Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate
Conviction for Aggravated Robbery, which came before this Court for hearing on May
11, 2006. Present at said hearing were the defendant, his attorney, Nyal C. Bodily, and
Deputy District Attorney T. Langdon Fisher. Prior to the hearing, the Court had received
the defendant's motion and accompanying memorandum, and the State's response
thereto. Oral arguments by both parties were presented in open court. Based on the
evidence presented at trial and on the parties' memoranda and arguments, the Court
enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.

State v. Roy Drake Irvin, Jr., court case no. 051904377
Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Order, p. 2 of 3

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The defendant entered the Fastback Convenience Store in Salt Lake County ("the
store" and held a knife against the store clerk, C.S. ("the victim"), to induce her to
open the store cash register. The defendant then took money from the register that
was under the victim's care and control, but which belonged to the store owner.
2. Still in possession of the knife, the defendant then told the victim to give him her car
keys. He then took her to the back of the store, talked about tying her up, and told her
to stay in the back of the store when he left. These actions—taking the victim's car
keys, removing her to the back of the store, talking about tying her up, and telling her
to stay put—were committed to facilitate taking the victim's personal vehicle. The
defendant left the building and drove away in the victim's personal vehicle.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Taking the money from the store cash register completed the first, separate offense of
Aggravated Robbery.
2. The defendant began a second, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery when he took
the victim's personal car keys, removed her to the back of the store, talked about
tying her up, and told her to stay there. When he then took the victim's motor vehicle,
the defendant completed the second, separate offense of Aggravated Robbery.

State v. Roy Drake Irvm, Jr., court case no. 051904377
Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Order, p. 3 of 3

ORDER
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law as outlined above,
the defendant's Motion to Vacate Conviction for Aggravated Robbery is denied.

DATED this

READ AND APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Nyal C. Bodily
Attorney for the Defendant

Addendum D

HOUSE BILL 185: CRIME INVOLVING A WEAPON
Utah General Legislation Session
Day 44, February 28, 1995
CLERK: [House Bill] 185: Crime Involving a Weapon, by David M. Bresnahan.
Committee votes 10 yes, zero no, 2 absent.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Representative Bresnahan?
REP. BRESNAHAN: Thank you Mr. Speaker. House Bill 185 is a very minor change to
our existing statute regarding the firearms enhancement. The change, you will see on
page 2 of the bill, on line 17, changing the word "firearm" to "dangerous weapon." This
broadens the ability of our law enforcement people to deal with the ever-increasing
problem of violent crime. This gives us the type of legislation that we have all talked
about in getting tougher on violent criminals. On page one, you will note the definition of
"a dangerous weapon" beginning on page - on line twenty, and it speaks to the fact that it
is based on the way the weapon is used. So, in other words, "a dangerous weapon", for
those that have had concerns, is not just simply that you've got a pocketknife in your
pocket, it depends on how you use it. So, anything could be "a dangerous weapon" if you
use it as such.
The committee did change the number of years from seven back to the original
five. And you will note the amended fiscal note has no fiscal impact. I appreciate your
support on this bill.
MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion to House Bill 185? (Pause)
[There] being no further discussion, [we'll] go back to the sponsor for summation.
REP. BRESNAHAN: Wave.
MR. SPEAKER: Summation is waved. Voting is open on House Bill 185.
(break in recording)
Being all present and having voted, voting will be closed. House Bill 185 (inaudible) 67
"yes" votes, zero "no" votes. Passes. [The matter will be] brought in before the Senate
for their consideration.
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ULC.A. 1953 § 76-1-401

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*si Chapter 1. General Provisions
K
d Part 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy
-»§ 76-1-401.
defendants

"Single

criminal

episode"

defined--Joinder

of

offenses

and

In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal
episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing m this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section
77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal
proceedings.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-401; Laws 1975, c. 47, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 127,
eff. May 1, 1995.
CROSS REFERENCES
Concurrent or consecutive sentences, limitations, see § 76-3-401.
Multiple offenses filed in single court, see Rules Crim. P r o c , Rule 9.5.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Criminal Law €=^>29, 620.
Double Jeopardy €=>139.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k29; 110k620; 135Hkl39.
C J S. Criminal Law §§ 14, 248, 255, 260 to 263, 266 to 267, 558 to 561.
C.J.S. Larceny §§ 53 to 54.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Burglary 9
Controlled substances 10
Driving offenses 7
Due process 1
Homicide 3
Joinder and severance, generally 2
Minors 11
Possession of firearms 6
Receiving stolen property 8
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*S Chapter 1. General Provisions
M Part 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy
-•§ 76-1-402. Separate
Included offenses

offenses

arising

out

of

single

criminal

episode-

(1) A defendant may be prosecuted m
a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of
a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall
be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction
and
sentence
under
any
such provision
bars
a prosecution
under
any
other
such
provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish
separate offenses under a single
criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney
is arraigned on the first information or indictment.

at

the

time

the

defendant

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An
offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
establish the commission of the offense charged; or

required

to

(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein, or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig
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necessarily
verdict or
conviction
such relief

found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of
entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if
is sought by the defendant.

Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 2.
CROSS REFERENCES
Rights of accused persons, generally, see Const. Art. 1, § 12.
Rights of defendant, see § 77-1-6.
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Criminal Law €==>29, 620.
Double Jeopardy € ^ 1 3 8 , 139, 161.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k29; 110k620; 135Hki:8; 135Hkl39; 135Hkl61.
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 14, 248, 251 to 253, 255, 260 to 263, 266 to 267, 558
to 561.
C.J.S. Larceny §§ 53 to 54.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
39 A.L.R.5th 283, Seizure or Detention for Purpose of Committing Rape, Robbery, or
Other Offense as Constituting Separate Crime of Kidnapping.
Treatises and Practice Aids
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 68, Multiple Offense Limitations.
1 Criminal Law Defenses
Limitations.

§ 84, Inchoate

Offenses

and

Complicity-Multiple

Offense

1 Criminal Law Defenses § 103, Felony Murder-Multiple Offense Limitations.
4 Criminal Procedure, Second Edition § 17.1(A), Joinder: Related Offenses.
4 Criminal
Character.

Procedure,

Second

Edition

§

17.1(B),

Joinder:

Offenses

of

Similar

4 Criminal Procedure, Second Edition § 17.2(A), Joinder of Defendants.
4 Criminal Procedure, Second Edition § 17.4(C), "Same Transaction" Joinder.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Double jeopardy,
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F>
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 7 6. Utah Criminal Code
^i Chapter 1. General Provisions
K
iai Part 6. Definitions
-•§ 76-1-601. Definitions
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means
action.
(3) "Bodily
condition.

a person whose

injury"

means

criminal

physical

pain,

responsibility

illness,

or

is in issue

any

in a

impairment

of

criminal

physical

(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" m e a n s :
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(l) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;
or
( n ) the actor represents to the victim verbally
is in control of such an item.

or in any other manner

that

he

(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure
actor is capable of acting.

to

act

when

(8) "Person" means
an
individual, public
partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical
control over tangible property.

there

or

is

a

private

possession

of

or

legal

duty

to

corporation,

to

exercise

act

and

the

government,

dominion

(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function

or

serious
of any
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bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious
bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain,
temporary
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ.
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing,
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information
or fixing information in a form capable of being preserved.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-601; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 244, § 1,
eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 205, §
26, eff. April 29, 1996.
CROSS REFERENCES
"Hazing" defined, penalties, see § 76-5-107.5.
Justification as defense, when allowed, see § 76-2-401.
Offenses against property, arson, see § 76-6-102.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Assault and Battery €=>56, 58.
Criminal Law €=>19 to 26.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 37k56; 37k58; 110kl9 to 110k26.
C.J.S. Assault and Battery §§ 75, 77.
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 31 to 44, 1110.
C.J.S. Negligence §§ 913 to 914.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
5 A.L.R.5th
Assault.

243,

Sufficiency

of

Bodily

Injury

to

Support

Charge

of

Aggravated

Treatises and Practice Aids
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 86, Omissions-No Duty to Act.
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 87, Omissions-Impossibility Defense.
1 Substantive Criminal Law § 6.1, Requirement of an Act
1 Substantive Criminal Law § 6 2, Omission to Act.
2 Substantive Criminal Law § 13 5, Enterprise Liability.
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C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
K
\i Chapter 3. Punishments
M Part 2. Sentencing
-•§ 76-3-203 8. Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used
(1) As used m
this
Section 76-1-601.

section,

"dangerous

weapon"

has

the

same

(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
was used m the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court:
(a) (l) shall
law; and

increase by one year

definition

a dangerous

as

in

weapon

the minimum term of the sentence applicable

( n ) if the minimum term applicable by
as one year; and

law is zero, shall

set the minimum

by

term

(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law in the case
of a felony of the second or third degree.
(3) A defendant who is a party
increases in punishment provided
beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(a) a dangerous
and

weapon

was used

to
m

m

a felony offense shall
Subsection
(2) if the

the commission

be sentenced to the
trier of fact finds

or furtherance

of the felony;

(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present.
(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony m
which a dangerous weapon was
used in the commission of or furtherance
of the felony and that person is
subsequently convicted of another felony m
which a dangerous weapon was used in
the commission of or furtherance of the felony, the court shall, in addition to
any
other
sentence
imposed
including
those
m
Subsection
(2) ,
impose
an
indeterminate prison term to be not less than five nor more than ten years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
Laws 2003,
2004.

c.

148, §

4, eff. May 5,

2003;

Laws

2004,

c.

276, § 2, eff. May 3,

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 7 6. Utah Criminal Code
*ii Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property
*d Part 3. Robbery
-•§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery
(1)
he:

A

person

commits

aggravated

robbery

if

in

the

course

(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined m

of

committing

robbery,

Section 7 6 - 1 - 601;

(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.

(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course
of committing a robbery' if it occurs m
an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or m the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7;
Laws 1994, c. 271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2003, c. 62, inserted m

subsec. (1)(c) "or attempts to take".

CROSS REFERENCES
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102.
Body armor, increase of sentence if worn m

violent felony, see § 76-3- 203.7.

Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq.
Enhanced penalty, certain offenses committed by prisoner, see § 76-3-203.6.

Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301.
Habitual violent offenders, definition and penalties, see § 76-3-203.5.
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C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
-•RULE 22. SENTENCE, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing
sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may
continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present
any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of
sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be
sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may
be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment
of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal
shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence. The
officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison
and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court.
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State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
Article IV Relevancy and Its Limits
•+RULE 403 EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence The change in language is not
one of substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained m Rule 403 See
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a
more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise " See also Smith v Estelle, 445 F Supp 647 (N D Tex 1977)
(surprise use of psychiatric testimony m capital case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process) See the
following Utah cases to the same effect Terry v Zions Coop Mercantile Inst, 605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979), State v
Johns, 615 P 2d 1260 (Utah 1980), Reiser v Lohner, 641 P 2d 93 (Utah 1982)
CROSS REFERENCES
Pretrial disclosure of evidence, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 26
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Calhster, Chapman v State, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony-An Issue of Admissibility or Credibility'?, 1983
UtahL Rev 381 (1983)
Cassell and Strassberg, Evidence of Repeated Acts of Rape and Child
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